啰嗦的话是该少写，因为写了没人看，还不如把博客当作日记写。

 

日本人就是这样做的，日本博客占全世界的37%，其次是36%，中文只有8%，因为日本博客经常更新，他们把博客当作日常生活，一种记载，而不是评论，不管有聊无聊的统统都写上去，所以他们才有灵感，灵感来自生活嘛！

 

今天亚太地区的股市很反复，香港恒生指数从最高涨500多点，到最低跌200多点，香港以后的股市还会这样走，波幅巨大！

 

展望一下，美国今晚议息，不会有太大的惊喜，毕竟减息是意料中，昨天已经消化了。今晚美国公布耐用品消费订单和原油库存！看来又得跌了，昨晚的疯狂是投机客的彻夜狂欢，因为他们赚的就是着1%-2%的利润，吃完拍屁股走人。

 

港股离10000点又近了些，A股离1500也近了些，不要光想抄底，想想逢低建仓。

 

如果你看了韩国今天的走势，韩国很有问题！

 

就这些，今天要去松江吃波波烧烤

Yes! Never mind stocks, although a few-1000-point dropped. When I click the link to the Japanese stock market link, it popped up with a big declined line shown on the TOPIX. Shame, while we were sleeping in the dream of a whole brand new world after the crisis last night, from the other side of the world, the US stock still in slumps. I understand when global financial market has become a part of your life, it is not easy! You maybe just need some pills to help you from sleeplessness.

As professor Krugman wrote on his blog, “…things are not looking good. Signs of an unfreezing in the credit markets are hard to find — maybe we shouldn’t have expected a quick result, but you do have to say that even the reformed Paulson plan has yet to produce any visible improvement in confidence. I’m most struck by the .04% yield on one-month T-bills — that’s depression-level flight to safety…” err… depression-level flight to safety, hope so, cross fingers.

I expect the market in China will fall 8-10% down without any rebounds, so will the Hong Kong stock. Thing goes f**king WRONG!

昨晚我又想了一些问题：

1.       美国，欧洲走向社会主义，错！政府是在保护金融危机的前提下，抄了一下底，或许两年后，或者五年后，政府能够从中获得丰厚的回报。中国政府在干啥？

2.       是不是如果没有美国的次贷危机，中国房市调控信贷紧缩等政策是否还在进行中？也许是美国救了我们一回，至少我们的房贷还没有出现违约。

3.       外需在减缩，内需也在减缩，拉动内需谈何容易！只要政府要用实际行动表个态，请各级干部早上喝一杯用奶粉冲的牛奶早餐先吧。

昨天美国疯狂反弹了一波后，今天在尾盘也抵押不了抛盘的压力，最终以下跌收盘。美国政府向银行提供美元担保，欧洲政府纷纷效仿，可是治标不治本，并没有看到信用市场上实际性的好转，个种不同评级的债券的spread还在不断的扩大，而次债的起源-房地产也没有实际性好转。所以这次大规模的救市只能让股市不再疯狂下跌，或者说暂时稳住了经济的衰退速度，但是却不能让投资者恢复信心。只因为投资者手里的子弹大部分用光了。所以我估计这次的危机尚未结束，救市有效但力度还是远远不足以扭转局势。或与等到大选后，美国人脚踏实地的重新振兴经济或许能够让牛市再临。缺的是信心。

 

中国政府并还没到砸钱救市的时候，因为上面还没有预见经济的大步回落。我们目前还是发展中国家，我们还不是消费国，国民收入还达不到领先水平，所以我们应该安守本分做好我们的工厂。如果我们还是一个工厂的话，降低成本，提高效率，增加生产才是最重要的。提高国民收入不能以提高劳动力报酬为主，控制热钱不能以紧缩信贷为主。保持经济稳定增长是国家发展的重要国策。并且要尽快解决医改，教改，土改等改革。

 

说股市，大家不要光说，光盼望股市好转，指数反转，现在是投资的最好时机。不管从技术，估值，目前都是买入的好时机。但是缺的是信心。关键在是当局如何解决投资者信心的问题。武同学说得好，当局需要解决以下4个问题，才能让经济恢复增长，企业盈利增长，投资环境改善。1.大小非问题，2.企业高赋税问题，3.信贷管制问题，4.国家基建建设问题。

 

国家需要有信心，企业才有信心，投资者一定会有信心

 

日前这场上世纪二十年代以来最猛烈的金融风暴吹袭了整个世界，给世界所有经济体带来了巨大的创伤。杠杠效应，过快膨胀，信用危机等都是虚拟经济埋下的恶果。在全球化经济下，来自美国的“喷嚏”次级债，迅速让全球市场感染了最严重的“流感”，金融危机。

当所有人都在等待美国人如何对付这场危机时，或者等待G7的财长们如何采取救市措施时，我们中国应该考虑如何去面对自己的问题，如果在这场金融危机中建立自己的地位。本人认为，中国作为一个“学生”，虽然这个学生在老师面前有点“愚”，但是正是我们的金融管制紧，创新较为保守，金融市场较为不开发才能让我们避过严重的创伤。老师“病”了，病怏怏的，吃完了家里的“药”。中国作为“学生”，虽然避免不了受到“老师”病毒的感染，但是这个“学生”最多就是轻度的感冒而已。当我们也在家中预备了“药”，而且有余的时候可以考虑借给“老师”一点，换取老师的一些不愿意教授给你的“书”，将会受益匪浅。所以这次金融危机实际上给中国的实体经济带来的影响虽然大，但是伤害相对有限。当西方国家都视我们是危机中的绿洲时，我们应该多一些自信，多一些胆量，对一些霸气应该站出来拯救这场全球危机，占领先机，建立自己的全球地位。

当然考虑到我们国情，考虑到政治，“拯救世界”也许只是一个美好的愿望而已。但是眼前中国需要做到的是：1.确保国内的政治稳定，解决民生问题，2.保持国内的经济稳定发展，3.吸取西方的教训积极进行经济体制改制，3.国内行业重新整合，产业创新，4.抢占资源，5.积极参与海外资产收购。这样中国才能在全球重新洗牌中得益。总之中国需要保持经济增长，需要找到发展的突破口，才能做到危机中的受益者。

国内的投资机会将是具备以下条件的产业实体

1.       地区优势

2.       寡头行业

3.       行业龙头

4.       背景实力

5.       资产积累

6.       领先技术

7.       良好记录

8.       利润潜力

9.       扩张潜力

[本文来自“维基百科”www.wikipedia.org]

是指1929年至1939年之间全球性的经济大衰退。

大萧条的影响比历史上任何一次经济衰退都要来得深远。这次经济萧条是以农产品价格下跌为起点：首先发生在木材的价格上（1928年），这主要是由于苏联的木材竞争的缘故；但更大的灾难是在1929年到来，加拿大小麦的过量生产，美国强迫压低所有农产品产地基本谷物的价格。不管是欧洲、美洲还是澳大利亚，农业衰退由于金融的大崩溃而进一步恶化，尤其在美国，一股投机热导致大量资金从欧洲抽回，随后在1929年10月发生了令人恐慌的华尔街股市暴跌。1931年法国银行家收回了给奥地利银行的贷款，但这并不足以偿还债务。这场灾难使中欧和东欧许多国家的制度破产了：它导致了德国银行家为了自保，而延期偿还外债，进而也危及到了在德国有很大投资的英国银行家。资本的短缺，在所有的工业化国家中，都带来了出口和国内消费的锐减：没有市场必然使工厂关闭，货物越少，货物运输也就越少，这必然会危害船运业和造船业。在所有国家中，经济衰退的后果是大规模失业：美国1370万，德国560万，英国280万（1932年的最大数据）。大萧条对拉丁美洲也有重大影响，使得在一个几乎被欧美银行家和商人企业家完全支配的地区失去了外资和商品出口。

原因

关于大萧条的成因一直众说纷纭。最早解释到这一点的是英国经济学家凯恩斯。他认为市场对商品总需求的减少，是经济衰退的主要原因，因而提出由政府采取扩张性财政策略来刺激需求，从而带旺经济。这一点成为了五、六、七十年代时人们普遍的看法。

但也有一些人提出不同的观点。现任联邦储备局主席伯南克认为是因当时美国兴起了消费借贷所致。持续性的借款终使美国人个人债务日增，而所造成的消费热潮也就在大萧条时期结束。诺贝尔经济学奖得主佛利民则认为是当时美国政府在大萧条前对经济做了很多管制所致，尤其是对银行的管制，使银行无法对货币需求做出反应，在通货紧缩下导致大萧条。

影响

大萧条的普遍影响导致了：

1.       提高了经济的计划性，也即是凯恩斯主义；

2.       以关税的形式强化了经济的民族主义；

3.       激起了作为共产主义替代物的浪漫-极权主义政治运动（如德国纳粹）。大萧条相对于其他单一原因来说是最能够解释为什么在1932年到1938年之间欧洲大陆和拉丁美洲各国政治逐渐右翼化。

4.       独裁者的崛起（如希特勒、墨索里尼），间接造成第二次世界大战爆发。

今天看到了一篇文章说中国大萧条的

by Krassimir Petrov

看看日期，二〇〇四年九月二日的文章

他分析了上世纪20年代美国大萧条的情况，结合中国与美国的关系，预测出中国将在08-09年将会不会出现大萧条

他所分析的假设条件都在今年逐一出现，是否步入大萧条，我们自己分析吧

主要是看看他的分析逻辑

 

CHINA'S GREAT DEPRESSION
by Krassimir Petrov, Ph.D.
September 2, 2004

Having recently completed Rothbard’s “America’s Great Depression”, I couldn’t help draw the parallels between America’s roaring 20’s and China’s roaring economy today, and I couldn’t help conclude that China will inevitably fall in a depression just like America did during the 1930s. The objective of this article is to present an Austrian argument as to why this must happen; to substantiate my arguments, I will be quoting Rothbard’s Fifth Edition where relevant.

Before proceeding any further, I would urge all readers who haven’t read Rothbard’s “America’s Great Depression”, to pick up a copy and read it. First, it is a real pleasant read, and Rothbard’s witty style of writing makes reading it fun. Second, the first part of the book develops the Austrian Business Cycle Theory, which is indispensable for understanding credit booms and their inevitable busts. Finally, the second part of the book elaborates the development and the causes of the Inflationary Boom of the 1920s and provides a basis for comparison with the economic policies of modern-day China.

In order to establish our parallel, we need some historical perspective of the relationship between a world superpower and a rising economic giant. In the 1920s, Great Britain was the superpower of the world, and the United States was the rising giant. As such, Great Britain ran its economic policies independently, and the U.S. adapted its own policies in a somewhat subordinated manner. Today, The United States is the hegemonic superpower of the world, and China is the rising economic giant. Not surprisingly, the U.S. runs its policy independently, while China adjusts its own accordingly.

Continuing our parallel analysis, during the 1920s the British Empire was already in decline, was militarily overextended, and in order to pay for its imperial adventures, resorted to debasing its own currency and running continuous foreign trade and budget deficits. In other words, Britain was savings-short, a net-debtor nation, and the rest of the world was financing her. Meanwhile, America was running trade surpluses and was a net creditor nation. Importantly from a historical point of view, the British Empire collapsed when the rest of the world pulled the plug on their credit and began capital repatriation. Today, the American Empire is in decline, is militarily overextended, and is financing her overextended empire with the “tried-and-true” methods of currency debasement and never-ending foreign trade and budget deficits. In other words, America is savings-starved, a net-debtor nation, and the rest of the world is financing her. At the same time, today China runs trade surpluses and is a net-creditor nation. When the rest of the world finally pulls the plug on American credit, will the American Empire also collapse?

The cause of the Depression, as Rothbard explains, was a credit expansion that fuelled the boom. According to Rothbard, “[o]ver the entire period of the boom, we find that the money supply increased by $28.0 billion, a 61.8 percent increase over the eight year period [of 1921-1929]. This was an average annual increase of 7.7 percent, a very sizable degree of inflation (p.93)…The entire monetary expansion took place in money substitutes, which are products of credit creation… The prime factor in generating the inflation of the 1920s was the increase in total bank reserves” (p.102). In other words, during the 1920s, the United States experienced an inflationary credit boom. This was most evident in the booming stock and the booming real estate markets. Furthermore, there was a “spectacular boom in foreign bonds… It was a direct reflection of American credit expansion, and particularly of the low interest rates generated by that expansion” (p.130). To stem the boom, the Fed attempted in vain to use moral suasion on the markets and restrain credit expansion only for “legitimate business. Importantly, consumer “prices generally remained stable and even fell slightly over the period” (p. 86). No doubt the stable consumer prices contributed to the overall sense of economic stability, and the majority of professional economists then did not realize that the economy was not fundamentally sound. To them the bust came as a surprise.

Today, in a similar fashion, the seeds of Depression are sown in China.  Economists hail the growth of China, many not realizing that China is undergoing an inflationary credit boom that dwarfs that American one during the roaring ‘20s. According to official government statistics, 2002 Chinese GDP growth was 8%, and 2003 growth was 8.5%, and some analysts believe these numbers to be conservative. According to the People’s Bank of China own web site (http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/baogaoyutongjishuju/), “Money & Quasi Money Supply” for 2001/01 was 11.89 trillion, for 2002/01 was 15.96 trillion, for 2003/01 was 19.05 trillion, and for 2004/01 was 22.51 trillion yuan. In other words, money supply for 2001, 2002, and 2003 grew respectively 34.2%, 19.3%, and 18.1%. Thus, during the last three years, money supply in China grew approximately three times faster than money supply in the U.S. during the 1920s.

No wonder the Chinese stock market has been booming and the Chinese real estate market is on fire. Just like the U.S. in the 20s, China finances today foreign countries, mostly the U.S., by buying U.S. government bonds with their trade surplus dollars. Just like the Fed’s failed attempts of moral suasion during the 20s, the Chinese government today similarly attempts in vain to curtail growth of credit by providing it only to those industries that need it, that is, only to industries that the government endorses for usually political reasons. Also, for most of the current boom, Chinese consumer prices have been mostly tame and even falling, while prices for raw commodities have been skyrocketing, which perfectly fits the Austrian view that prices of higher-order goods, such as raw materials, should rise relative to prices of lower-order goods, such as consumer goods. This indeed confirms that credit expansion has already been in progress for a considerable time, and that inflation now is in an advanced stage, although it has not yet reached a runaway mode. Thus, economic conditions in China today are strikingly similar to those in America during the 1920s, and the multi-year credit expansion implies that a bust is inevitable.

There are also important parallels regarding currency and export policy. During the 1920s, the British Pound was overvalued and was used by smaller countries as a reserve currency. While Britain ran its inflationary policies during the 1920’s, it was losing gold to other countries, mainly the United States. Therefore, “if the United States government were to inflate American money, Great Britain would no longer lose gold to the United States” (p. 143). Exacerbating the problem further, the Americans artificially stimulated foreign lending, which further strengthened American farm exports, aggravated the net-export problem, and accelerated the gold flow imbalances. “It [foreign lending] also established American trade, not on a solid foundation of reciprocal and productive exchange, but on a feverish promotion of loans later revealed to be unsound” (p. 139). “[President] Hoover was so enthusiastic about subsidizing foreign loans that he commented later that even bad loans helped American exports and thus provided a cheap form of relief and employment—a cheap form that later brought expensive defaults and financial distress” (p.141) Thus, the preceding discussion makes it clear, that the fundamental reasons behind the American inflationary policy were (1) to check Great Britain’s drains of gold to the United States, (2) to stimulate foreign lending, and (3) to stimulate agricultural exports.

Similarly, today the dollar is overvalued and used as the reserve currency of the world. The U.S. runs its inflationary policy and is losing dollars to the rest of the world, mainly China (and Japan). Today, the currency and export policy of China is anchored around its peg to the dollar. The main reason for this is that by artificially undervaluing its own currency, and therefore overvaluing the dollar, China artificially stimulates its manufacturing exports. The second reason is that by buying the excess U.S. dollars and reinvesting them in U.S. government bonds, it acts as a foreign lender to the United States. The third reason is that this foreign lending stimulates American demand for Chinese manufacturing exports and allows the Chinese government to relieve its current unemployment problems. In other words, the motives behind the Chinese currency and export policy today are identical to the American ones during the 1920s: (1) to support the overvalued U.S. dollar, (2) to stimulate foreign lending, and (3) to stimulate its manufacturing exports. Just like America in the 1920s, China establishes its trade today not on the solid foundation of reciprocal and productive exchange, but on the basis of foreign loans. No doubt, most of these loans will turn out to be very expensive because they will be repaid with greatly depreciated dollars, which in turn will exacerbate down the road the growing financial distress of the banking sector in China.

Therefore, it is clear that China travels today the road to Depression. How severe this depression will be, will critically depend on two developments. First, how much longer the Chinese government will pursue the inflationary policy, and second how doggedly it will fight the bust. The longer it expands and the more its fights the bust, the more likely it is that the Chinese Depression will turn into a Great Depression. Also, it is important to realize that just like America’s Great Depression in the 1930s triggered a worldwide Depression, similarly a Chinese Depression will trigger a bust in the U.S., and therefore a recession in the rest of the world.

Unless there is an unforeseen banking, currency, or a derivative crisis spreading throughout the world, it is my belief that the Chinese bust will occur sometime in 2008-2009, since the Chinese government will surely pursue expansionary policies until the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in China. By then, inflation will be most likely out of control, probably already in runaway mode, and the government will have no choice but to slam the brakes and induce contraction. In 1929 the expansion stopped in July, the stock market broke in October, and the economy collapsed in early 1930. Thus, providing for a latency period of approximately half a year between credit contraction and economic collapse, based on my Olympic Games timing, I would pinpoint the bust for 2009. Admittedly, this is a pure speculation on my part; naturally, the bust could occur sooner or later.

While I base my timing of bust on the 2008 Olympic Games, Marc Faber, the foremost Austrian authority in the world on Chinese economic development, believes that the bust will occur sooner. According to him, the U.S. is due for a meaningful recession relatively soon, which in turn will exacerbate already existing manufacturing overcapacities in China. This, coupled with growing credit problems, makes him believe that China will tip into recession sooner than the Olympic Games. In other words, Dr. Faber believes that a U.S. recession will trigger the Depression in China. Indeed, that very well may be the trigger, but if so, it still remains to be seen whether the Chinese government will let the bust run its course or choose the route of a “crack-up” boom, come hell or high water.

We should also consider another possible trigger for a bust, namely trade surpluses turning into trade deficits due to the accelerated rise of prices for resources, such as commodities, which China must import. Faced with trade deficits, China may decide to dishoard surpluses by selling U.S. government bonds, or it may decide to abandon its peg to the dollar. In either case, this will exacerbate the problems of the ailing U.S. economy, which in turn will boomerang back to China.

Finally, the bust may be triggered by a worldwide crisis in crude oil supplies. Peak oil supply is around the corner, if not already behind us, and Middle East or Caspian instability could sharply cut oil supplies. Historically, oil shortages and their concomitant rise of oil prices have always induced a recession. China’s growing dependence on oil ensures that should an oil crisis occur, it will slip into recession.

To summarize, the likely candidates for a trigger to the Chinese depression are (1) a worldwide currency, banking, or derivatives crisis, (2) a U.S. recession, (3) the containment of runaway inflation, (4) the disappearance of Chinese trade surpluses, and (5) an oil supply crisis.

Whatever the trigger of the bust in China, there is little doubt that this will provide the onset of a worldwide depression. Just like the U.S. emerged from the Great Depression as the unrivalled superpower of the world, so it is likely that China will emerge as the next.

 

绅士始于欧洲的王室贵族

钱钟书老先生称为“尖头鳗”，调笑了一番中国的那帮伪绅士们

中国之绅士，必定是儒和雅，必定谈笑风生，不是王室贵族，就是翰林学士

英国的绅士“尖头鳗”文化定义为：

 

说是简单，落实起来确实难

如果稍微不注意就俗了

如果稍微做过了就变做作

 

英国人John Morgan吃香蕉的时候

把香蕉横放在盘子里

用刀叉切除两头

然后横向切开一刀

用叉子拨开香蕉皮

其后才将香蕉切成小块

优雅送入口中

 

放在古代，不管中西，都会称其为高雅

放在现在不被鄙视算是不错的待遇了

 

在维多利亚时代英国

绅士的楷模是：

行为优雅

信仰虔诚

生活朴实

洁身自律

舞蹈，音乐，骑马，设计，击剑，运动

酷爱艺术

 

按照这个标准，我这个中国人至少能算得上是半个绅士

 

随着时代的变迁，生活的进步

许多思想渐渐被遗忘

从工业时代，革命时代，科技时代，到现在新潮流主导的一切

许多人对于“尖头鳗”都有不同的判断和要求

而老一套的东西就是俗，保守，古板，落后

即使在中国，何来之儒雅

 

我们不需要做到完美，但是，

必要的，礼让还是要的

例如：为女士开门，为老人让座

 

我觉得新时代需要雅士，需要绅士，不需要所谓的“尖头鳗”

看看那些做作的行为

穿着名牌

驾驶宾利

口嚼牛排

读四书

听话剧

说英文

留洋学

打高尔夫球

私人会所

 

对，你们雅

请看看他们会搭配吗？

开车技术高明还是闯红灯？

会用刀叉吗？恐怕筷子都那不好

读懂孔子孟子的真谛了吗？还是边读边炒股

听得懂莎士比亚的浪漫后直接去开放狂欢

说来说去的hello,yo man,whats up

留过洋就是雅士？问问你的中文是不是更溜了

全民高尔夫就有修养了吗？还是动不动就动粗？

私人会所就是你们的鸦片馆子

 

好了

奥运后，太空漫步后

国人需要静下来考虑一下

怎样提高国民素质

 

从

思想解放

遵守规则

脚踏实地

公平竞争

做到务实，不急躁，提高做事效率

注重礼仪，注重文学，注重古典

等

 

嗯。。。

最起码的

不要乱穿马路

不要插队

不要大声喧哗

注重衣着整齐，干净

注意谈吐和行为

为女士开门

说话要说“请”

 

绅士需要一点一点做

从骨子里自信

从骨子里绅士

 

完

 

 

 

应“宝宝”的要求

这里改为平时的随笔和心情日记

至于我们的故事转到了秘密spaces里

所以。。。

。。。没有所以

无聊写写东西

跟大伙们交流交流

很久没有跟大伙们联系了

实在过意不去

以后多多包涵

以后多多捧场

很久没有写东西了

生疏

生疏

 

July

七月，英文里是源于古罗马凯撒的名字Julius命名的

夏天来了，从冬天到夏天，走过了半年

是一个不可思议的半年

记载着许多美好的故事

 

7是个奇妙的数字，间与6与8之间的自然数

一周有7天，因为上帝觉得6天工作太累了，需要第7天来休息

音乐有7个音阶，也只有7才能奏出美妙的乐章

7也是西方的幸运数字

我也是

 

999999 除以 7 刚好是 142857

所以 1/7 的循环有六个数字，它们不停重复

不信你可以试试

 

七月并不重要，前面所说的也不重要

但是七月里有一天却因你而存在

记住了

别忘

 

my life

sparkled every moment of mine

with LOVE

 

j'adore toi

le joyeux anniversaire

Une lettre romantique d'amour qui parle à ma passion pour mon chéri

Le titre vient des trois premiers mots de cette lettre romantique d'amour

......

je vous adore

 

 

 

我25岁了

 

离30岁还有5年

 

再过同样长的时间（实验证明会比前25年过得快）的时间就到50岁

 

还要工作40年才可以天天自然醒

 

距离人生第一目标还有10年，什么目标现在不能告诉你

 

所以还有10年时间可以奋斗

 

Bro! You have 7 years to catch up, be strong and be tough! Proud of You!

 

Hi dear friends! Sorry, we are kind of losing contact! But you must know I love you guys!

 

Hey babe! 4 years is not really a big gap! You know what I mean! Love you!

 

Between H and L is also 4 letters apart, between us is distant-less!

 

愛してる + 大好きだよ